Blurring Lines of Terror

After the Oslo terror attacks, the Boston Marathon bombings and the Woolwich attack, it is time to reflect on the blurring line of international terrorism and domestic extremism as Europe once again seems to be behind the curve.

Several incidents happened recently which were carried out by Muslim individuals that shine a light on new trends in terrorist acts. Two Chechen men, who were not born in the US but grew up there, placed several bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three people and injuring 264. Two men in Woolwich, England brutally attacked a soldier in civilian clothes then attacked the police constables arriving on the scene. The perpetrators were Muslims born in England and one of them at least only converted to Islam later in his life. Furthermore, a French soldier patrolling the outskirts of Paris was attacked by an allegedly Muslim perpetrator, stabbing the soldier in the neck, wounding him severely (the details of this attack and the motives behind it are still unclear).

In the light of these incidents one must contemplate the consequences and draw new conclusions about the differences and similarities between international terrorism and domestic extremism. The Athena Institute have been concentrating solely on domestic far-right/left extremist groups (the Hungarian Roma serial-killers, Anders Breivik or the National Socialist Underground), differentiating them from any kind of international or state funded terrorist organizations, be that Islamist like Al Qaida or separatist like ETA or the IRA. However, the aforementioned attacks are signalling a changing picture where the lines between organized domestic extremism and international terrorism – as we understood these two phenomena previously – are becoming more and more blurred.

The perpetrators of both the Boston bombings and the Woolwich attacks can be considered home-grown extremists (the French attacker’s background is still unknown); they were not members of any international terror organisations and they planned and carried out their attacks without direct help or funding from such groups.

The facts mentioned above show uncanny similarities between the Tsarnaev brothers, Michael Adebolajo and members of organised or informal domestic extremist groups, thus it is getting harder and harder to make a clear-cut differentiation between the perpetrators of such attacks and domestic extremists who carry out acts of terrorism (sometimes causing mass casualties) and spread hostile propaganda.

After the first five years of the 21^st century that to some extent was a 'success story' for international Islamist terror groups like Al Qaida, marked by mass casualty terror attacks both in the US and the EU, it seems Islamists have changed their strategy due to the serious pressure put on them by national security and international law enforcement agencies both in Europe and North-America. Today these groups are less likely to organize or fund an attack directly; instead they make a huge effort in the field of online and offline radicalization via a plethora of websites, leaflets, blogs, Youtube videos, radical Imams, etc.

Hence, people who carry out attacks based on an Islamist extremist ideology can be characterize as domestic extremists, since they have a lot in common with perpetrators like Anders Breivik, the Death Squad in Hungary, or the NSU in Germany. They are home-grown, they are lone wolves or work in small informal groups and they became radicalized by extremists and extremist materials online and offline. This also means that law enforcement agencies might have to alter their methods to be able to hinder future attacks.

The second ramification of recent developments is that far right domestic extremist groups like the English Defence League or other Islamophobic organisations need these attacks like a glass of water in the Sahara. Islamist and Islamophobic extremists feed off of each other. A previous example of that could be seen in Benghazi when an anti-Islam film made in the United States was used to spark massive riots in Egypt, then in Libya, leading to the murder of several members of the US diplomatic corps; and in England where the EDL, the BNP and other extremists immediately tried and are still trying to capitalize on the murder of the British soldier.

The systemic weaknesses that all EU countries are to face, including especially the massive problems with the integration of immigrants make Europe vulnerable. If the recent tendency continues and we face a future where we have to think of Islamist extremism driven terrorists as European domestic extremists, our approach to the problem has to be altered. Also, these kinds of attacks fuel far-right extremism further, hence it can lead to violent clashes between far-right groups and immigrant communities. Considering the fragile nature of the relationship of all European countries with their minority – esp. immigrant – communities, it is safe to say that – on one hand - Al Qaida and other international terrorist organisation can use this fragility for their own gain to destabilize European countries and – on the other – far-right extremist groups can exploit this trend to reach larger audiences and gain bigger political influence, which in return can lead to even greater pressure on mainstream politics to turn towards anti-democratic policies in immigration and freedom of religion.

For Europe, it is high time to consider implications and if necessary alter policies to confront a potentially deteriorating trend to make sure that dark-future scenarios – in which old and new (immigrant) communities of Europeans are terrorizing each other in a downward spiral of intimidation and violence – will remain just that; scenarios.